ABSTRACT – A Course Irresolute: The United States Marines Advanced Base Force in the Age of Theodore Roosevelt 1898-1909
The Marine Corps is enmired in an existential crisis. Forces beyond its control are pushing it to adopt new and novel missions, leading to a deep schism between those championing the status quo, and those interested in adopting innovation.
The progressive side of the argument is that the Marines must change in order to support the Navy, and U.S. foreign policy, in keeping with national naval strategy.
Conservatives charge that the changes that have already been enacted will result in an irrelevance of the Corps, and an eventual dissolution — their appeal to lawmakers to prevent the changes from going forward has found its way through the press and hallways of Congress.
Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, Subcommittee on Naval Academy and Marine Corps, begin today, Thursday, January 7, 1909.
A conventional reading of Marine Corps history paints an unwavering through-line from Marines’ service aboard ships in the 18th and 19th centuries — serving as sharpshooters in the rigging, in landing parties in Africa and the Caribbean, and as shipboard security against disorder and mutiny — to the Advanced Base Force at the turn of the 20th century, and on to the Fleet Marine Force as the dedicated amphibious arm of the U.S. Navy in the 1930s. Tradition portrays the adoption of the amphibious mission by the Marines as fait accompli. However, a more nuanced interpretation, such as that of Sean F.X. Barrett in “Innovators or Onlookers? The Marine Corps’ Journey to the Advanced Base Force” lends credence to the argument that if the Corps wasn’t an altogether reluctant participant in the adoption of a new mission following the Spanish American War, it was largely coerced into doing so by the General Board of the Navy and the by the reformist movement that influenced the New Navy in the latter quarter of the 19th century.
Much as the improvement in the range of naval guns and ship’s armor negated the need for sharpshooter Marines in ships’ rigging over time, and the increased sophistication in both sailor’s responsibilities and Navy officers technical knowledge in the New Navy negated the need for Marines as shipboard enforcers, the change in the Navy’s role from that of continental defense force to one of strategic control of distant sea lanes meant the Marine Corps would have to join the Navy in a transition into a new and expanded portfolio of capabilities, or face obscurity and dissolution.
While the Navy was engaged in fundamental professional and strategic thought development in the 1880s and 1890s, the Marine Corps never really progressed beyond individual technical development of officers and NCOs, such as establishing a School of Application to familiarize junior officers and enlisted men in the ways of the Corps. However, within the Navy, the formation of the United States Naval Institute (USNI), the Naval War College (NWC), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and Proceedings magazine, ensured an acceleration in the professional and strategic development of officers, replacing the “culture of the quarterdeck” focused on ship handling under sail.
Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor’s direction in the establishment of the NWC, combined with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings on history and strategy, exemplified a quantum leap in the approach to understanding naval war, and the requirements the New Navy would have to address in terms of strategic support. As early as 1890 Mahan identified the Marine Corps as a suitable force to establish forward bases that could support the fleet in combat over the seas. This mission, accomplished by an “advanced base force” would provide security for the support fleet in foreign waters, allowing the colliers, supply ships, hospital ships and tugs necessary for replenishment and repair to operate unhindered.
Coincidentally, this new mission reflected the accomplishments of Huntington’s Battalion during the Spanish American War — in April of 1898 Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood collected a 600-man battalion from every Navy yard on the east coast, and assembled them at Brooklyn, from where they sailed for Key West, to train as a unit with an as-yet indeterminate mission to execute at an undisclosed objective. The time spent on the beach at Key West proved effective. Marines from multiple units drilled and bivouacked together, making a measure of sense in the chaos of their mobilization. As the Marines had to this point avoided garrisoning permanent battalions or regiments, having a battalion of five companies of infantry, supported by one of field artillery, provided the Navy with a capable, ready force for combat ashore.
In support of a Navy strategic requirement of maintaining the blockade and cordon of Cervera’s squadron at Santiago de Cuba, the Navy needed a safe harbor where they could coal their ships nearby, without fear of attack by Spanish forces. During a brief fight during June, the Marines defeated the Spanish force at Guantanamo, giving the Navy a rudimentary anchorage and base for operations in and about Cuba and Puerto Rico. Despite the chaos of mobilization, in the culling of Marines from numerous locations to form a battalion serving under unfamiliar officers, Huntington’s Battalion was able to land and achieve its limited objective at Guantanamo before the Army could even set sail aboard leased shipping from Tampa for the main attack near Santiago.
The ensuing overwhelming victories against the Spanish in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico validated much of the developing naval strategies posited by Mahan and his peers. President McKinley recognized the role the Navy played in the victory and sought to reinforce their successes immediately following the end of hostilities.
In addition to the extant institutions at the USNI, NWC, and ONI, President McKinley and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, at the urging of Rear Admiral Taylor, placed the hero of Manilla, Admiral Dewey, in charge of the newly formed General Board in 1900, which replaced a number of ad hoc boards that had been formed in response to a limited number of events in years prior.
The General Board was formed by the Navy because the concept of military control of the armed services, through a General Staff, a la the German General Staff, was too foreign to American sensibilities, but the need for an advisory body that provided a focus for war planning and direction of the various Naval Bureaus would be essential in competition with the Great Powers. The General Board designated what threats should be planned for, and prioritized, giving the oft-changing civilian Secretary of the Navy competent strategic direction.
With the establishment of the General Board of the Navy, and its earliest studies, the Navy found the Marines would be integral to strategic mission of the New Navy, providing the Advanced Base Force necessary to support of the fleet in its control of sea lanes in foreign areas. Without advanced bases, the Navy would not be able to conduct the essential functions of refueling and refitting the fleet in hostile waters.
The requirements of the Advanced Base Force were much more than merely landing Marine infantry and supporting field pieces. The force would need the ability to dig trenches, emplace naval guns ashore in semi-permanent emplacements, run communications lines, emplace and man searchlights, and emplace and control naval minefields defending the approaches to any anchorage. Additionally, the physical security of all facilities, including the repair shops, dry docks, and hospitals from attack by any enemy landing forces would be provided. Prior to this shift in mission, small numbers of Marines had attended Army artillery and Navy mines courses, as well as the NWC, but the concept of Marines serving outside the roles of traditional infantry, yard security, or shipboard police, required enlightened leadership.
Over the first decade of the new century the Marines made attempts to adopt the mission, but numerous operational commitments, a lack of permanent formation and staffing, and a comfort with more familiar missions prevented the Marines from accomplishing anything near the spirit or letter of the directives. Due to a lack of imagination amongst the conservative leadership of the Marines Corps, it was the General Board of the Navy that provided the impetus for the organization and doctrine of the Advanced Base Force going forward.
The Marines’ reluctant adoption of the ABF mission is evident in an examination of naval exercises over the span of Theodore Roosevelt’s twelve years of national service — starting in his capacity as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in William McKinley’s first presidential administration, and culminating in his welcoming The Great White Fleet home from its unprecedented year-long circumnavigation of the globe in the last days of his presidency. The ongoing development of U.S. Navy doctrine regarding naval landing parties shows the Navy was willing to continue carrying any amphibious mission tasks following Roosevelt’s tenure, whether the Marine Corps was involved or not.
Theodore Roosevelt’s interest in naval matters, whether in the development of the dreadnought fleet, or in naval diplomacy, may have been unsurpassed by any other resident of in the history of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Author of a history of the naval war of 1812, advocate of Mahanian strategic thought as early as 1890, followed as a most active Assistant Secretary of the Navy, willing to take actions the Secretary wouldn’t, TR maintained a daily involvement in the affairs of the Navy during his seven and a half years in office.
His familiarity with the reform movement in the Navy, his friendship with Army brass, and his occasional dust-ups with the Corps, influenced Roosevelt’s attitudes towards the Marines. Despite the General Board having decided the Marine Corps was essential to fleet strategy, Roosevelt openly revealed his advocacy for the eventual Army absorption of the Corps. Removing the Marines from shipboard duties in 1908 highlighted his mercurial nature, his disdain for Marines, and his disdain for the political influence the smallest military service exerted in the halls of Congress. Reactions to Executive Order 969 demonstrated both the Marines’ lobbying strength in Congress, and the enemies TR had developed on the Hill over his time in office.
The combination of these factors, and the attempt by President Roosevelt to diminish the Marine Corps through executive action, shows that the adoption a new mission for the Marine Corps in an era of increased international competition pinned conservative elements in the senior ranks of the Corps against a small group of Marine officers and the greater Navy reform movement looking for change. Failing to see a forest for the trees in an era of increased international competition involving Germany, Britain, and Japan may not be an inaccurate description of Marine leadership in this era.
At the close of this period, it would be clear that the Marine Corps had assured its continued existence through the political means it had established in earlier go-rounds, but also that it had been shaken by Roosevelt’s actions and the public attitudes of the Army and Navy towards the Marines’status. In the second decade of the century, a new commandant and his staff exhibited a doctrinal development and dedicated focus on mobilizing dedicated or permanent units of the ABF. While the ABF would not be tested in combat with another great power, the availability of permanently formations of Marines available in designated Navy yards, or already aboard ships at sea, meant that the Marine Corps had taken a step forward as a force ready to implement U.S. strategic naval policy, and U.S. foreign policy. This portion of the tale will be covered in a succeeding post.
SOURCES:
Oyos, Matthew In Command Theodore Roosevelt and the American Military Potomac Books 2018
Shetter, Randy M. Assaulting the Littorals: The Development and Evolution of a Dedicated American Amphibious Assault Force Masters’ Thesis California State University, Long Beach 2011.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Little, Brown and Company Boston 1890 Kindle Edition
Mobley, Scott Progressives in Navy Blue, Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity 1873-1898. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2018 Kindle Edition
Costello, Daniel Joseph Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-1914 PhD Thesis Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 1969 Calhoun Institutinal Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School
Secretary of the Navy Annual Reports of the Navy Department Washington, United States Government Printing Office 1897-1917, HathiTrust.org website
Hone, Trent Learning War, The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy 1898-1945 Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2018 Kindle Edition
Daugherty III, Leo J. Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945, Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina and London, 2009 Kindle Edition
Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy, The U.S. NAVY and the BIRTH of the AMERICAN CENTURY, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2009 Kindle Edition
Barrett, Sean F.X. thesis
Naval landing party article
Costello, General Board thesis
Naval Affairs Committee 1909
USNI Proceedings
Shulimson and Cosmas, Heinl award article on 969
Del Col, Roy Lewis TR as AsstSecNav
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