Review: Military Landing Operations by Major Dion Williams, USMC


 Review: Military Landing Operations by Major Dion Williams

    In July of 1906, the Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association, (presently INFANTRY), published an article written by Major Dion Williams, USMC, titled “Military Landing Operations”. The article shows a certain level of sophistication in amphibious doctrine of the time. Williams had his own experience with landing parties — he led Marines ashore at Cavite following Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay and was an instructor on landing operations at the Naval War College. But his writing reflects the experience of the landings at Guantanamo, the Army’s experiences in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and in various fleet exercises conducted since then. They also reflect the decades of “corporate knowledge” gained by Marines and Bluejackets in executing landing parties the world round since 1775. What may be most interesting in his piece, and when it was written, is that in putting pen to paper on this subject, as the Marine Corps was going through a generational change in mission, he initiates the crafting of what would become canon for  American amphibious doctrine. 

 

“Military Landing Operations” may be viewed as a primer for amphibious planners; Williams covers hydrography of landing beaches, drawing on anecdotes of landings made in the Philippines; he explores the equipment and boats a regiment-sized landing expedition would require, including the advantages of flat bottomed landing craft; he repeats the critically essential planning function of loading transports “last on - first off” to ensure efficient operations and reduced confusion on landing beaches; and in keeping with naval doctrine of any age, he reiterates the importance of sea-control to any amphibious operation; Williams describes the execution of ship-to-shore movement, and speaks of the challenges of landing under fire, decades before official doctrine addressed the matter. 

 

Using sketch-maps, Williams lays out landing beaches, their approach, and covering naval gun fire, and touches on best uses of beach reconnaissance. Before closing, Williams outlines what is needed for an effective defense of a landing beach and roughly sketches out the ratio of defenders to attackers needed for success. 

 

In his closing, Williams argues that the training for the landing force, and the sailors aboard transports and landing craft, is essential for operational success, otherwise landings on foreign soil will be restricted to permissive landings at commercial ports and wharves. In addressing the Army officer corps, he pleads for the burying “personal ambition” in dealing with the Navy to attain success. Decades before the coining of the term “joint”, Williams made the case for cooperation between the services by reminding the reader of the challenges of the recent war with Spain. While Williams’ writing offers us insight into the level of sophistication in amphibious thought at that time, it does not offer solutions to issues that would crop up in ensuing decades; concepts as communications and control, scope of command responsibility, and staff responsibilities, would require years of genuine experience through exercises and actual fighting to gain resolution.


This review is a small part of a larger piece I'm working on about the Marine Corps, the Advanced Base Force, and the development of Marine Amphibious Doctrine prior to the Great War. 

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