Executive Order 969 and the Development of U.S. Amphibious Doctrine
Executive Order 969 and the Development of U.S. Amphibious Doctrine
John S. Naylor – 24 September 2025
10th Commandant, 1903-1910
Ten years after the Spanish American War, the Marine Corps remained in a state of transformation, from being shipboard enforcers and navy yard watchmen, to a becoming a landing force capable of supporting Navy fleet operations. Proof of concept exercises at Nantucket, Culebra, and Subic Bay were dress rehearsals for the nascent Advanced Base Force, then yet to be fully formed due to operational exigencies. Expeditionary units of the Marine Corps had fought in the Boxer Rebellion, fought in the Philippines, enabled the independence of Panama from Colombia, and supported the Army in Cuban pacification. But during this era, it was Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 969 which remains the most remembered event of the year 1908. Oft regarded as one of a number of attempts to abolish the Corps, it showed that Marine leadership fully embraced the Advanced Base and Expeditionary missions; it was dissembling by Roosevelt and Leonard Wood that forced Marines to fight to reverse the executive order.
1908
In 1908, Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” circumnavigated the globe, testing planners’ theories on moving the battle fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific rapidly, stretching then current limits of technology and the nascent logistics capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The massive evolution was a response to increased tensions with Japan, which had been exacerbated by the San Francisco School Board controversy, and the success of the Imperial Japanese Navy over the Imperial Russian Navy at Tsushima. Roosevelt based many of his decisions on the U.S. fleet regarding Japanese capabilities, asking the General Board and Naval War College for plans that would eventually incubate into War Plan Orange.
The Marines at Subic Bay continued their proof-of-concept fortifications on Macmany Point and Grande Island, showcasing the Advance Base Force mission. Major John A. Lejeune took command of the Philippine Brigade upon the departure of Lieutenant Colonel James E. Mahoney. Captain Hiram I. Bearss assigned Lieutenant Pete Ellis to a detail on Grande Island at the mouth of Subic Bay. Ellis’ mission was “emplacing naval guns sited seaward, as well as laying protective minefields, mounting searchlights, and positioning of the equipment to protect the strategic harbor.”[1] This was Ellis’ second stint in the Philippines, but his introduction to the planned defense of island bases.
In Washington, Major General Commandant Elliot sought support for better facilities stateside to garrison and train Marines in the Advanced Base Force mission. At League Island, he sought to station two battalions of Marines at the ready. Their ability to rapidly deploy would be buttressed by the establishment of permanent Quartermaster manufacturing and warehouse facilities in downtown Philadelphia. Given the real estate constraints of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, he proposed purchasing property on Long Island where units could conduct drills and field exercises. In Cuba the 1st Provisional Marine Regiment continued in its expeditionary role, reporting to the Army of Cuban Pacification and maintaining peace in the countryside for a second year.
Given the repeated requirements being made of the Marine Corps to rapidly assemble and deploy expeditionary battalions, and commitment to the Advanced Base Force mission, Commandant Elliot requested a dedicated naval transport to serve along with USS DIXIE, and PANTHER. Transporting Marines “over the seas” on the decks of battleships proved to be a less-than-optimal means of amphibious transport, Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole made note of when he and his expeditionary regiment sailed to Panama in June of 1908.
“The trip has, in my opinion, demonstrated the undesirability of using battle ships for transports, not only on account of the cost, but of the discomforts to the men and difficulties in handling stores and the desirability of having transports on hand always ready to move expeditions of this sort at a moment’s notice.”
Cole and his unit deployed to Panama to join the forward stationed Marine unit permanently based there to assist in providing security for national and local elections in a country seeking to maintain independence from Colombia.
In July, there were reported to be 2,022 Marines of a service total of 9,100, aboard the ships of the Navy, providing security for the captain of the ships, and policing discipline among the sailors. Despite the three-fold increase in the size of the Corps, largely due to the new ABF and Expeditionary missions, most Marine leaders viewed the role of shipboard detachments at the core of their traditional mission and pinned their belief in the service’s future on maintaining that role. This stubborn stance on the role of the Corps led to conflict in the wake of the drafting of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 969.
Naval reformers, emboldened by Roosevelt’s love of the Navy and his selective love of progressivism, redoubled their efforts to remove Marines from the shipboard role of policeman and enforcer, with the aim of establishing nine regiments ashore for expeditions over the seas. The reformer’s interests over twenty years ranged from the abolition of the silos created within the Navy Department by a bureau system[2] that controlled appropriations within the Navy, the organization and promotions of the officer corps, how the next war at sea would be fought, and what ships the Navy was buying. Aligned with the General Board, the reformers drew the ire of Roosevelt’s many opponents in Congress for public disputes with the latest in a series of Roosevelt’s Navy Secretaries. However, Fullam and the reformers weren’t the only antagonists to the traditional Marine Corps mission.
The Army, led by the Army General Staff, and Major General Leonard Wood, recently Governor of Moro in the Philippines, was experiencing a transformation of its own, having grown rapidly and abandoning the mission as an internal domestic constabulary for an imperial one overseas. Pacification in the Philippines and Cuba meant the Army needed troops; were the Marine Corps dissolved, 9,000 well trained officers and men, many experienced in overseas assignments, might be made available to an Army still tasked with a coastal defense mission. Leonard Wood’s advantage in steering this course lay in his friendship and access to Roosevelt, who’d been his subordinate in the 1st American Cavalry, during the war with Spain.
President Roosevelt, who’d run on a platform of reform, personally objected to the Marine practice of running to the Secretary of the Navy, or Congress, for preferential treatment, every time their silo was threatened (he didn’t seem to have any issue with the reformers within the Navy turning to him for assistance under similar conditions); Roosevelt judged the Marines and their lobby as an infernal nuisance. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt had experience resolving internal Corps disputes, ranging from the argument over whether sutlers should continue selling their wares on post, versus the establishment of a post exchange system,[3] and the preferential assignment of Marine Barracks commands.[4]
On the Navy side, Lieutenant Commander William Freeman Fullam had been arguing for removal of Marines from the ships of the Navy since 1890,[5] and through Lieutenant Commander William Sims, Roosevelt’s Naval Aide, had the ear of the President. Over the summer of 1908 the naval reformers mobilized a political effort within the Navy, and its controlling bureaus, to assign Marines to shore stations, without notifying Major General Commandant George F. Elliot; Elliot was not kept in the loop, because in the past, anytime the naval reform movement acted to remove Marines from ships, the Commandant and members of his staff successfully lobbied the Secretary of the Navy to forgo the action. As Elliot learned of this new movement, he asked the Secretary if he could appeal directly to Roosevelt. Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf informed Elliot that he had already ordered the Marines’ removal from USS NEW HAMPSHIRE, MONTANA, NORTH CAROLINA, IDAHO, and MISSISSIPPI, roughly 800 Marines, but did allow Elliot to meet with Roosevelt.
Resolved that the Marines viewed removal from shipboard service as an existential threat, even if Elliot didn’t, Roosevelt tasked Elliot with developing a schedule of assignments once the Corps was removed ashore. Elliot turned to his staff, including Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, Lieutenant Colonel James Mahoney, and Major Charles J. Long, all experienced in the Advanced Base Force mission, to drafted what became Executive Order 969.[6]
In accordance with the power vested in me by section 1619, Revised Statutes of the United States, the following duties are assigned to the United States Marine Corps:
(1) To garrison the different navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.
(2) To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
(3) To man such naval defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses, as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
(4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama.
(5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.
Theodore Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE, November 12, 1908,
(No. 969)
In crafting the framework of the order, Elliot and members of his staff accepted removal of Marines from shipboard security duties, accepted the advanced base and expeditionary missions, and accepted the force in readiness expeditionary mission. Aside from the published terms, Elliot’s staff recommended the service form nine garrisoned regiments to avoid the ad hoc confusion of drawing Marines from numerous Navy Yards to form emergency battalions.
In EO969, Marine leaders wrote their own prescription and expressed their belief in the future of the Advanced Base Force and shipborne expeditionary unit missions. They accepted a mission that the Navy didn’t have the manpower to perform itself, and that the Army was either incapable or unwilling to execute. From a doctrinal development perspective, it showed where Marine leadership thought the future of the Marine Corps lay.
Roosevelt allowed the Marines an escape plan from the shipboard security controversy, however, it was short lived. Shortly after the announcement was made, news accounts revealed that Roosevelt and Major General Leonard Wood, fresh from service in the Philippines, had been in discussions about abolishing the Marine Corps, turning the well trained and experienced Marines over to the Army to fill gaps in the Infantry.
One of Roosevelt’s greatest gripes about the Marine Corps was their predilection towards self-advocacy. As naval reformers exulted over the first Marines being removed, the Marine officer corps mobilized politically, but Elliot forbade any lobbying by his officers, most of whom viewed the change in mission as a death-knell. Army leadership had been looking at absorbing the Marines for several years, to man coastal batteries, allowing the Army to expand its Infantry footprint. Leonard Wood lobbied the president, showing him that his executive powers over the Marine Corps allowed him to move the Marines on land anywhere he wished. Wood broached the subject with several Marines, who informed Elliot. Feeling betrayed, Elliot blew up in response. When challenged on this state of affairs, Roosevelt replied that he fully supported his mentor and friend, and that the Corps should be absorbed into the Army.
As Congress convened hearings on Roosevelt’s action, Navy leadership reiterated that they only wanted the Marines removed from shipboard service, not the Navy Department itself; its previous experience with the Army in executing any advanced base or expeditionary missions had become mired in failed communications and mismatched expectations in regards to roles and responsibilities.
So, with Roosevelt’s betrayal in the open, Commandant Elliot reversed himself and allowed his officers to engage in lobbying Congress. So, in the finest tradition of fighting forces through the ages, when faced with an existential threat, the Marines turned to Congress for their survival at the end of 1908.
[1] Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett. “Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880-1923. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 1997. p.44
[2] The eight bureaus within the department were: Yards and Docks; Equipment; Navigation (personnel and operations); Ordnance; Construction and Repair; Steam Engineering; Supplies and Accounts; and Medicine and Surgery.
[3] Shulimson, Search, pp. 156-162
[4] In 1897 Roosevelt had to referee a dispute between Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington and Major Percival Pope over who would command the Marine Barracks at New York, Boston, and Mare Island. Pope won the popularity contest, which must have made the deployment to Guantanamo a year later awkward, with Pope (BnXO) reporting to Huntington (BnCO).
[5] William F. Fullam. “The System of Naval Training and Discipline Required to Promote Efficiency and Attract Americans”. USNI Proceedings. October 1890.
[6] Jack Shulimson and Graham A. Cosmas. “Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Sea-Going Mission”. The Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. 1982 Memorial Award in Marine Corps History. Marine Corps Gazette. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC. 1982.
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