George Barnett - Advanced Base Commandant
GEORGE BARNETT – ADVANCED BASE COMMANDANT
John S. Naylor - 1 May, 2026
George Barnett has not been widely remembered or celebrated for his tenure as the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Indeed, after six-years as commandant, he was replaced in the post by a Marine eight years his junior, three years before he was required to retire. During his career he had been awarded no personal decorations for combat heroism. His most important service friendships were most likely those he developed among his Naval Academy classmates. Other Marines judged him as being “political”, and historians don’t remember him much for his accomplishments. However, there may have been no Marine of the era more perfectly positioned to run the Marine Corps.
Barnett was a product of the Naval Academy, class of 1881, and his early professional career coincided with the excitement created by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan’s works, and a country looking outward and overseas created an optimism that surrounded the creation of the “new Navy”. Barnett was one of the first ten of fifty Marine lieutenants commissioned through the Naval academy between 1883 and 1898. As such, he shared the officers’ messes with the fraternity of naval officers aboard ship and at shore stations. During this period the academy was the sole commissioning source for the Corps, a condition that would create a division within the officers of Corps, aligning those with academy ties against those who hadn’t. And while the excitement of the age didn’t seem to have much influence on the path of the Marine Corps, Navy officers had designs on the Marine Corps in their plans for the 20th century.
George Barnett’s career before the war with Spain was routine, with just a bit of unconventional mixed in. In 1883 the newly minted Lieutenant Barnett found himself parked on the Marine Corps promotions ladder in, where he served fifteen years as a lieutenant before pinning on captain’s bars. Following his commissioning, he received Marine officer training at the Marine Barracks aboard the Brooklyn Navy Yard. From there he was posted to the ocean tug USS PINTA on the west coast, and to the Marine Barracks at Siska in the Alaska Territory. Then, a shipboard billet with the Marine detachment aboard USS IROQUOIS preceded his posting to the DC barracks, which included special duty at the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893. From there he was assigned to the Marine barracks at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, then to a receiving ship at Brooklyn, USRS VERMONT, before commanding the Marine detachment aboard USS SAN FRANCISCO. With the start of the war with Spain Barnett transferred to the USS NEW ORLEANS née AMAZONAS which served in Cuban waters.[1] NEW ORLEANS missed the Battle of Santiago, one of the few opportunities for military glory for Marines during the war.
At the turn of the century, Barnett’s Navy peers enjoyed a most exciting and rewarding period of peacetime expansion in American history. As congress freed up appropriations for new technology and ships, the Navy made significant investments in the professional development of her officers. The Naval War College, as envisioned by Stephen Luce, and the writings of Alfred Mahan fueled the strategic imagination in a generation of Navy officers. The organization of the Naval Institute, and its Proceedings magazine encouraged debate on the course of the Navy. Beyond maneuvering squadrons and fighting the fleet, professionals considered the logistics and administration required to support the fleet. All realized that when operating in foreign waters, the fleet would need safe locations to refuel and rearm. To secure these locations, these advanced bases, the Navy would need a landing force trained and equipped for operations in the littorals; some, including Mahan, viewed the Marines as being, ideally, the “backbone to any force landing on the enemy’s coast”.[2]
The war with Spain was the first naval war in a generation for America, and whether one “saw action” during the hostilities mattered within the insular brotherhood of the Marines. Shortly afterwards, combat experience gained against the Spanish, and in the Philippines, and during the Boxer Rebellion, would establish credentials for leaders, and set combat veterans aside from their peers. Seeing action accelerated the careers and promotions of more than a few. The ultimate case of this recognition occurring in the case of George Elliot, who, as a captain, served as a company commander at Guantanamo, where he was brevetted for heroism; Elliot become Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps five years later.
George F. Elliot, USMC
In February of 1914, after commanding the Advanced Base Brigade in a crucial, but successful exercise at Culebra, in the Porto Rican Territory, George Barnett assumed the post of Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps. If his 1915 annual report to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels is any indicator, he was fully invested in the Advanced Base Force mission, and in the training Marines required to support it:
“It is manifest that the companies assigned the difficult task of preparing themselves to carry out these special cuties should always be kept up to their full strength: that a sufficient number of such companies should be assigned to the duties, and, being so assigned, that they should not be diverted from their highly technical training in order to provide mobile forces for expeditionary duty, detachment s for navy yards, or for other purposes.”
In terms of organizational development, the Marine Corps did not enjoy the same sort of renaissance the Navy did, in the years leading up to the war with Spain. Commandant after commandant fought for appropriations to improve facilities, and to maintain the most basic manning levels to support the shipboard guard and navy yard security assignments. Marine leaders fought off critiques initiated by Navy officers intent on pushing Marines into obscurity to advance their own purposes. However, the lessons learned in prosecuting the Spanish war of 1898, in the form of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington’s mission to Guantanamo, spurred the General Board to demand capabilities from the Corps to match the operational needs of the fleet.
Robert Huntington, USMC
Shortly after its commission in 1900, the General Board of the Navy ordered studies drafted on coaling stations in the new territories, and on an “advanced base force”. After a decade of gestation, and existential battles with the Navy and the Army, and commitments to numerous non-advanced base expeditions, George Barnett found himself at the head of a Marine Corps possessing capabilities in the ABF only dreamed of by the naval reformers of the 1880s. Barnett had proved himself within the Marines and Department of the Navy as an ideal administrator of the service.
These studies plunged the Marine Corps into a force transformation in the first decades of the 20th century; circumstances required a rapid evolution from their service as a small security force tasked with shipboard and navy yard security, to an expanded colonial constabulary, and an “advanced base force”. Conservatives within the organization clung to its traditional roles aboard ship and in Navy yards, but warmed to the role as a colonial constabulary in a fit of organizational inertia. This instinct ran counter to the operational needs of the fleet; those who gravitated towards the naval character of the Marines recognized that the advanced base force mission was where they should invest their efforts. As a colonial constabulary, the Marines performed as a smaller, more nimble version of the Army, but still reporting to a Navy command and the State Department. On occasion, at the directive of the President, they could report directly to the Army. In the other camp, Marine leaders recognized that the advanced base mission was strictly devoted to the operational purposes of the Navy in the age of Mahan. Seizing, building, and defending advanced bases suited to a fleet operating in foreign waters, made the Marines essential to 20th century naval power.
“the ships of our battle fleet must return to the advanced base and recoal, refit, revictual, transfer the wounded, and make ready to take advantage of the first victory and carry the war to the enemy’s territory.”[3]
A decade before the war with Spain, the reforms of the “new Navy”, and the writings of Alfred Mahan, shaped strategic thinking among the Navy officer corps and influenced U.S. foreign policy. As strategists pushed for an increase in the size of the U.S. fleet, in ships competitive with the navies of Europe and South America, they considered the means to support the fleet in foreign waters. Operations away from the protection of North American harbors required a logistics train, as well as bases on foreign shores. Theorists determined “advanced bases” could support the fleet when required, as demonstrated by the Japanese at Port Arthur in 1895. As early as 1890, Navy officers, such as William Fullam, proposed the Marines abandon their shipboard security tasking for a role as naval infantry, garrisoned on shore, and ready for rapid deployment in support of the Navy. The Guantanamo landing of 1898 was a proof of concept of this plan.
“… and a base was established where colliers and supply ships were enabled to lie snugly at anchor and ships of the blockading force might coal and revictual therefrom in perfectly smooth water without going far from the scene of operations.”[4]
Under the guidance of Admiral George Dewey and the General Board, Navy and Marine leaders ironed out organizational and administrative matters surrounding the advanced base mission. The Marines and Navy integrated the mission into annual fleet exercises when possible, and made promises to themselves to repeat the exercises every year.
George Dewey, USN
To accomplish this mission, the Marines would deploy guns taken from the decks of cruisers and battleships and emplace them in temporary hilltop revetments by bolting them to heavy, buried, timber platforms. These guns overlooked harbor approaches and “submarine minefields” detonated by remote control. Manning these weapons, as well as the searchlights, machine guns, and engineered, temporary shore positions, would be the Marines of what was called the “fixed” regiment. Supporting them would be the “mobile” regiment — companies of infantry Marines provided to maneuver against any enemy landing force seeking to destroy the advanced base. The “mobile” regiment could also be redeployed to assist in further offensive operations. All the Marines of the brigade received the same basic infantry training and could fulfil multiple roles.
As with many initiatives fueled by good intent, operations tempo and commitment to other expeditions prevented the Marines from reaching a demonstrable consistency in supporting the new mission. Whenever the Corps managed to collect enough Marines to train on the new mission, emergencies cropped up, requiring deployment of any hands available. This frustrated the Navy, the General Board, and Marine proponents of the advanced base force mission. The Culebra fleet exercises of January 1914 proved to be a watershed moment, dispelling much of the Navy criticism of the Marines (it’ll never go away completely), with an added bonus of having a fully trained and equipped brigade-in-readiness aboard ship, as a crisis brewed in Mexico. Colonel George Barnett commanded the Advanced Base Brigade for that exercise.
Barnett was in command of the brigade because he’d commanded the Marine Barracks at Philadelphia since 1910. The barracks were the parent command of Marines aboard the navy yard, including those running the Advanced Base School. The staff of the school composed the cadre for the “fixed” regiment of the ABF. The Philadelphia Navy Yard, on League Island, had become an embarkation hub for Marine expeditions of the era. The Marine Quartermasters owned a large warehouse in the city where they stored and manufactured much of the tentage, uniforms, and equipment used by Marines in the field. Philadelphia was also a quick train ride from the Navy yards of the northeast — Portsmouth, Boston, Brooklyn, DC, and Norfolk — which granted the commandant the ability to gather a large force from the barracks for service “over the seas” within 24 or 48-hours. This had been the traditional means by which the Marine Corps responded to orders for a battalion or regiment of men, such as in 1885 for the Panama expedition, or Guantanamo in 1898.
Major General Commandant George Elliot opened the Advanced Base School in New London in 1910, and Major General Commandant William Biddle moved the school to League Island the following year. By that time, Barnett was already in command of the barracks there, and assumed much of the responsibility for the school. Lieutenant Frederic Wise, stationed at League Island, wrote:
“Hours every day in the Yard we had to haul those three-inch guns around. We had to build a portable railroad. We had to dig pits. We had to build gun-platforms. We had to mount the guns. And then, when we had it all done, we had to tear the whole business down and do it all over again.”[5]
The school’s location in Philadelphia was a double-edged sword, however; as multiple expeditions for service in the Caribbean were ordered, the commandant drew on the barracks for men to staff them. Commandant Biddle reported
“The course at the Advance Base School, Philadelphia, Pa., has been materially interfered with by the expeditions to Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Cuba, though actual service in the field has been of great value to the 3-inch landing gun battery and the signal company.”[6]
Barnett himself deployed four times in four years before the Culebra exercise. In the wake of the success of the Porto Rican exercise, Barnett was summoned to DC, and anointed Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps in February of 1914.
Barnett had peers vying for the post with more combat experience — regarded a qualifying trait by many of the conservatives in the Corps — but possessed the ideal qualifications and background to nurture development of the advanced base outfit. George Barnett had been appointed to the United States Naval Academy in 1877, as the Navy was entering a renaissance in professionalism. While at Annapolis, Barnett developed life-long connections with his fellow midshipmen, some of whom would go on to greater things in business, and in Congress. Graduating in 1881, he encountered the sclerotic promotions system afflicting the naval services. After their two year stint as “passed midshipmen” serving with the fleet, not all graduates of the USNA were offered commissions; the Navy had a backlog of 200 graduates waiting for up to eight years for a position in the fleet to open up.[7] Rather than being cashiered, Barnett accepted one of ten Marine commissions.[8] Because of these problems with commissions and promotions, the USNA Class of 1881 formed a lobbying group on the behalf of themselves. Early on, George Barnett learned the art of self-advocacy and lobbying within the Navy Department.
So after thirty years in the service, George Barnett became the first graduate of the Naval Academy to become Commandant. His close ties to peers in the Navy granted him the access and connections required to navigate the halls of government, and to be able to negotiate support for the growing service. Barnett’s competitors for the commandancy were not-selected for reasons; as a Lieutenant Colonel, John Lejeune was not senior enough; Lincoln Karmany, Barnett’s classmate at Annapolis, was a drinker, and had just gone through a public, messy, divorce; Littleton Waller was a drinker, not an academy grad, and remained notorious for publicity generated in his service in the Philippines.
Littleton Waller, USMC
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels chose Barnett over the more senior, popular, and conservative Waller, polarizing many of the officers of the Corps. On his side, Barnett had no black marks in his service record book and had married well; in 1908 he wed Lelia Godon, a well-respected widow and member of DC society. Barnett however, ascribed his selection to the success of the exercise at Culebra, where his command accomplished all objectives within the proscribed interval, and successfully “fought off” an attacking opposition force. The Marines’ performance even garnered praise from one of the Marines’ greatest critics, Captain William Sims.
Going into the exercise, the Corps was smarting from the most recent attack made by long-time critic Captain William Fullam, USN, then Daniel’s aide for inspections. In 1913 Fullam penned a scathing critique of the Advanced Base School and Brigade. In the critique he argued that the Marines had shirked their responsibilities in maintaining their equipment and in training; he also claimed that the service lacked consensus on inventory and organization. Fullam proposed he be given full command of the brigade and school, as he was the only individual who could make the needed corrections. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt received this report, forwarding it to the General Board. Commandant William Biddle crafted a reply to Fullam’s assault, and the General Board supported him. But the General Board also gave Barnett a list of deliverables for the upcoming exercise at Culebra. The menu showed the level of sophistication the Board expected in the Marines’ ability to effectively make a landing:
1. Stowing material on transports;
2. Landing material from transport to the beach;
3. Transporting the material from the beach to various sites;
4. Preparation of battery sites and mounting of guns;
5. Establishment of fire control and observation points;
6. Planting of mines;
7. Defense of mine fields;
8. Establishment and use of searchlight stations;
9. Exercise with guns, including tartet practice;
10. Covering the site selected against attack from the land, including transportation necessary for supply and handling material.[9]
The Advanced Base Brigade performed as well as anyone could foresee, and Fullam’s recommendations were soon forgotten. Barnett became commandant, and appointed John Lejeune his assistant.
As commandant, Barnett led the service with the guidance of the General Board — focusing on its role as a landing force capable of securing an advanced base for the Navy. However, expeditionary work continued apace, with a large commitment made to the occupation of Haiti in 1915, where 2,000 Marines under Littleton Waller deployed to keep the peace, and to the Dominican Republic in 1916. At home, the United States embarked on a course of mobilization to maintain its neutrality as the war in Europe raged. The Marines grew from 15,000 hands in 1915 to 31,000 before Congress declared war.
Most histories of this era cover the Corps’ involvement in Hayti, and in France, while overlooking the continued work of the advanced base unit. Advanced base work continued at the League Island Navy Yard, as Barnett endeavored to keep the advanced base brigade viable. His aim was to keep 3,500 Marines on the east coast in the advanced base force, and 1,500 on the west coast. To support training of the Advanced Base Brigade, and for other emerging missions, the Marine Corps acquired a little plot of land on Chopawamsic Creek in Stafford County, Virginia to give Marines the room to practice their advanced base rituals, and prepare for the war in France.
As the U.S. entered the war, the idea that the Navy would need to secure an advanced base to support naval operations remained even as Marines and doughboys fought and died in the trenches and tangled woods of northern France. Captain, then Rear Admiral, William Sims, served as an umpire at the landing exercise at Culebra in 1914, and painted a glowing picture of the fitness of Marines and their capabilities.
“Attention is invited to the very complete outfit of the Advanced Base Detachment and to the great variety of military work required of officers and men. Rifle pits and bomb proof shelters have been dug, 3” and 5” guns have been landed in transports, dragged up steep declivities and installed ready for firing. Methods for both direct and indirect fire have been perfected for both fixed and field artillery. Mine fields have been laid, and an aviation camp has been established. The problem of supply to the numerous outlying camps has been well worked out in a waterless country almost devoid of supplies. A very complete system of communications, including 4 miles of telephone system, a radio plant, a night and day heliograph system, and a flag semaphore system have been established. All parts of this work seem to have been done in an extraordinarily efficient manner.”[10]
Sims became the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe for the war. In his quest to combat enemy submarines, he proposed landing a force of 20,000 Marines to take the port of Cattaro on the Adriatic Sea; his goal was to provide an advanced base for fleet operations against the Austro-Hungarian Navy.[11] The Allies, burned by the failure of the amphibious attack on the Dardanelles at Gallipoli, refused Sim’s proposal.
William Sims, USN
When Commandant Barnett asked to increase the size of the Corps from 30,000 to 75,000, he did so because he maintained that the advanced base mission remained the Marines raison d’être, despite the fighting in France.[12] He promised the General Board, and Secretary Daniels, that he would continue to man and improve the Advanced Base Brigade.
“I said this because the only reason for the existence of the Marine Corps is naval, and I did not intend to have the Navy ever call for extra Marines and be unable to supply them, no matter how I would have hated not having them serve with the Army at that time.”[13]
General Barnett used his connections from Annapolis to great effect in getting Marines to the fighting in France, politicking for inclusion in the American Expeditionary Force. He fought for the Marines to remain in their regiments and not be fed into the maw of the war as individual replacement troops. When the Army told him that they had no room on their troopships for the voyage to France, Barnett turned to his Navy contacts to secure transport. Advanced base mission or not, Barnett understood the importance of the Marines fighting alongside the Army, as did his assistant, Colonel John Lejeune.
“When the United States entered the World War, the Allied fleets had already obtained control of the sea except for the submarine menace. Ther was not available naval mission, therefore, for an advanced base or expeditionary force. At that time, our officers and men were clamoring for service. Their adventurous spirit could brook no delay. Their thoughts were constantly turned towards France.”[14]
The little plot of land on the Chopawamsic Creek flourished as a training base for Marines bound for France, Haiti, and the four corners of the planet. With time it became known as the “Crossroads of the Corps”.
Perhaps Barnett’s greatest challenge as commandant was his relationship with Secretary Daniels. Daniels was a reformist Democrat, who immediately clashed with the conservative minds in the Navy Department, Marines included. One of his first reforms was in limiting time accrued by staff officers in choice billets. He enacted a 4-year time limit on the occupancy of the commandancy, requiring reappointment for a longer period. To put this policy in place, he asked for a signed, undated, letter of resignation from Barnett. Barnett, who thought he understood the ins and outs of Washington politics and bureaucracy, refused. Daniels seemingly let the refusal pass.
Barnett’s quest for a third star, as well as the enmity of Smedley Butler, and Butler’s father, Thomas — a leading light on the House Subcommittee for Naval Affairs — and unrelated charges of nepotism on all sides, in preferential treatment for relatives in the junior officer ranks, created a miasma of ill will towards Barnett. As the Democratic Secretary Daniels aligned himself with the influential Republican Butler senior, Butler junior pushed for his own advancement, and the advancement of John Lejeune to the commandancy. Woodrow Wilson’s illness removed him from the political machinations, and Daniels and Butler got their way with Barnett’s ouster. Barnett appealed to Wilson, but in the end, his assistant, Lejeune, assumed the commandancy. Refusing to resign, Barnett was allowed to stay on active duty until retirement, serving as commander of the Department of the Pacific. Barnett retired in 1923, and died in 1929.
Marines of the Advanced Base Force, ca. 1901
If you regard the development of the Advanced Base Force as an essential step in the evolution of American amphibious doctrine in the 20th century, it’s hard to think of a Marine more suited for the commandancy at that time than George Barnett. In 1914, John Lejeune was too junior to assume the mantle of responsibility for the entire Marine Corps, and Barnett had political ties unmatched in the Corps except for Smedley Butler. Barnett had been brought up in an era where naval supremacy hadn’t been attained by the U.S., yet, and required leaders bought-in to reforming traditional Marine and Navy roles in operational thought. Concurrent to his career, Navy planners at the Naval War College were drafting plans that would develop into Plan Orange, positioning the United States against Japan in the Pacific. The Advanced Base Force became an integral tool to the Navy in being able to take the fight to Japanese waters. With time, the ABF would morph into the Marines’ Expeditionary Forces on both the east and west coasts, and into the Fleet Marine Force in the 1930s. The steps taken on this path, shepherded by the likes of George Barnett, created the environment where planners and force commanders could prosecute the fight across the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. In many standard measurements of Marine careers, George Barnett’s career may appear pedestrian, and lacking in the glory of some of his peers. And his exit from the commandancy was not graceful, or a heroic moment in the annals of the Navy Department. But Barnett was close to uniquely qualified for the position at that moment, and deserves requisite recognition in the history of American amphibious doctrine.
[1] AMAZONAS was a Brazilian warship built in Newcastle, England by the Navy in May 1898, and re-named USS NEW ORLEANS. She served in the blockade of Cuba but was at Key West when Cervera’s squadron attempted to break out of Santiago de Cuba on 3 July. As per 19thcentury conventions, “cowardice” was alleged.
[2] Jack Shulimson. The Marine Corps Search for a Mission; 1880-1898. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence. 1993. p.144.
[3] Dion Williams. “The Naval Advanced Base”. NWC, 1912.
[4] Dion Williams. “The Naval Advanced Base”. U.S. Naval War College, Newport. 1912.
[5] Frederic Wise. A Marine Tells It To You. J.H. Sears & Company, Inc. New York. 1929. p.119.
[6] Commandant’s Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 1913.
[7] George Barnett. George Barnett, Marine Corps Commandant: A Memoir, 1877-1923. Andy Barnett, ed. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. Jefferson. 2015. Kindle edition.
[8] Jack Shulimson. The Marine Corps Search for a Mission; 1880-1898. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence. 1993. USNA class of 1881 commissioned 3 assistant naval constructors, 3 engineers, and 7 ensigns of the line, as well as the 10 Marine lieutenants.
[9] “Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps 1900-1970. History and Museums Division. Washington, DC. 1973.
[10] George Barnett. George Barnett, Marine Corps Commandant: A Memoir. (details)
[11] Leo J. Daughterty III. Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945. McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers. Jefferson. 2009. Kindle edition.
[12] “Approximatedly 30,000 marines were in France at the end of the war out of the 72,963 leathernecks on active duty.” Merrill L. Bartlett. “George Barnett” in Commandants of the Marine Corps. Allan R. Millet and Jack Shulimson, ed. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 2004.
[13] George Barnett. George Barnett, Marine Corps Commandant: A Memoir, 1877-1923. Andy Barnett, ed. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. Jefferson. 2015. Kindle edition.
[14] John Lejeune. The Reminiscences of a Marine. Dorrance and Company, Inc. 1970. Kindle edition.
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