SERVICE BEYOND THE SEAS: ADVANCED BASES, EXPEDITIONS, AND LANDING OPERATIONS - Section IV
SERVICE BEYOND THE SEAS
ADVANCED BASES, EXPEDITIONS, AND LANDING OPERATIONS
1899-1923
SECTION FOUR
GRADUATION
Racial nativism returned California to the world’s stage when the California legislature passed the Alien Land Act of 1913. In it, they brought Japanese-American relations to a head much like the San Francisco School Board did in 1906. Japan protested the act discriminated against Japanese living and working in the U.S., and that it discouraged immigration. Just installed in the White House, Woodrow Wilson’s administration discouraged the California law, but recognized that the Navy must be ready in the Pacific for potential hostilities. This tension returned PLAN ORANGE to the forefront of the Navy’s planning efforts, and they sought Army buy-in for the plans. The greater geopolitical friction continued to make the Navy’s plans, and the Marines’ advanced base force as relevant as ever.[1]
Despite the best intentions behind opening the Advanced Base School, the accelerated operations tempo of ensuing years made the Marines’ objectives difficult to reach. Constantly drawing on advanced base marines at League Island for expeditionary work in the Caribbean limited time in training in specialist skills. The 1912 expeditionary deployments to Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Cuba rolled over into 1913. The 2nd Provisional Brigade deployed aboard Army transport and USS PRAIRIE in February 1913 bound for Guantanamo, under Colonel Lincoln Carmany. Colonels George Barnett and Joseph Pendleton each commanded a regiment; by June the brigade returned to the states, repopulating the Advanced Base School cadre. Commandant Biddle reported,
“The course at the Advance Base School, Philadelphia, Pa., has been materially interfered with by the expeditions to Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Cuba, though actual service in the field has been of great value to the 3-inch landing gun battery and the signal company.”[2]
As units deployed and returned to Philadelphia the advanced base outfit worked on creating its own doctrine; Marines ashore at Guantanamo reviewed and revised the Navy’s “Landing Force and Small-Arm Instructions” manual, focusing on the drill around the employment of the 3-inch landing gun. Units designated as the 1st Advanced Base Regiment were,
“composed of C Company, a mine company trained to handle harbor defense mines; E Company, a signal company specialized in radio, telephone, telegraph, buzzers, and visual signaling; a field artillery battery which manned 3-inch field pieces; F and I Companies, which manned fixed batteries intended to be mounted for harbor defense; and H Company, which was trained both as an engineer company and as a machine gun company.”[3]
Training continued through the summer and fall, with courses and equipment set up for the 5-inch battery, 3-inch battery, 3-inch landing gun battery, mine company, signal company, and engineer company. Advanced Base Marines involved totaled 26 officers and 700 enlisted. In the signal company classes were held in elementary electricity, telegraphy, wireless telegraphy, and practical work as linemen. It was intended for the Advanced Base Brigade to deploy in January 1914 with the Atlantic Fleet for Winter Maneuvers.[4] When the Navy department ordered the fleet maneuvers on February 5, 1913, Commandant Biddle pledged 1,797 men for maneuvers.
With the influx of equipment and ordnance for the advanced base outfit in Philadelphia, the Marines vied for any available warehouse space in which to store, maintain and train on their equipment. Captain Logan Feland, USMC, worked on making modifications to the Navy Mark I Mine to suit the Marines’ purposes and allow for remote detonation from shore stations. Feland, an architect by training before taking a commission with the Corps, had been involved in submarine mine development and deployment since 1905. Because of the Advanced Base School activity, and limited barracks space available at League Island, Marine Corps recruit training was moved to the Norfolk Navy Yard, where recruits were housed under canvas. With an eye on being able to train year-round, Commandant Biddle recommended a return to the Naval Station at Charleston, South Carolina, where the weather was more agreeable. In September 1913, the General Board held hearings on making the Advanced Base Brigade a permanent organization within the Marine Corps. Assistant Commandant Eli K. Cole argued against permanent battalions, claiming they reduced flexibility for the Marine Corps — Cole believed that the larges permanent units should be companies He also made the argument for additional transports for the service.
FULLAM’S REVENGE
In 1911 Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer created the naval aid (sic) system to reduce the silo mentality of the various bureaus. In doing so, he created four flag billets reporting to the Secretary; operations, inspections, personnel, matériel aids each provided the department with guidance regarding the bureaus they supervised. When Josephus Daniels became Secretary of the Navy in 1913, Commander William F. Fullam, USN, became the aide responsible for inspections. In his position, Fullam reviewed the facilities and operations at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in the summer of 1913, including the Advanced Base School.[5] In his inspection, Fullam blasted the Marine Corps for failing to sufficiently meet its obligations in developing, maintaining, and training an advanced base force. He lodged his criticism with the Secretary of the Navy, and the General Board of the Navy.[6] Fullam’s criticisms ran the gamut from a lack of a fully developed doctrine, a lack of joint centralized management of training and deployments, inadequate manning, obsolescent equipment, a lack of facilities, no formal, permanent command and leadership of the unit, and finally that leadership failed to acknowledge that the Marines of the fixed regiment were to be highly-skilled technicians requiring specialized technical training, and weren’t just common riflemen.
Putting his criticism into perspective, for two decades Fullam had made it his mission to remove Marines from shipboard duty; he argued that their absence would allow for greater Navy officer and petty officer development and improve sailors’ morale. While he hadn’t been an active participant in the 1908 Executive Order 969 controversy, he had asked Theodore Roosevelt’s naval aide, Lieutenant Commander William Sims, to broach the subject of removing the Marines with the president. Upon further coaching by Major General Leonard Wood, Roosevelt ordered their removal from shipboard duty, which threw Commandant George Elliot and the Corps into significant damage control. An innate conservatism reigned amongst the officers of the Corps, and several attacks over the decades by the Army and Navy motivated Marines to view any challenge to their status quo as a threat; absorbing the Marines into the expanding U.S. Army as promoted by Leonard Wood was anathema.
Sometimes lost in Fullam’s obvious enmity for the Marines was his belief that when Marines were finally removed from ships of the line, they would be forced to reorganize and change their focus.
“The corps would be invaluable as a highly trained, homogeneous, and permanently organized body of infantry, ready at all times to embark and co-operate with the navy in service like that at Panama a few years ago. The education of marine officers at Annapolis fits them perfectly for service in connection with the navy. Both the marine and the sailor will be rendered more efficient by such a course.”
In the finest tradition of Marine commandants faced with an institutional assault on the very existence of the Corps, Commandant Biddle crafted a rebuttal and mobilized political allies in Congress. Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, USN, still the President of the General Board, sent a letter on behalf of the Marines to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, dated 21 July 1913.
Secretary Daniels asked Admiral Dewey and the General Board for their thoughts on the Marine Corps and the advanced base force, as they’d been responsible for assigning that mission to the Marines in 1900, and had been responsible for all recommendations regarding service expansion, training, composition, and exercises made in the intervening years. Admiral Dewey noted that Lieutenant Commander Fullam’s critique thinly veiled his same old bugaboo, Marines acting as security aboard ships. What Dewey may not have predicted was Fullam’s proposal that he was solely the best suited, and experienced officer available to command the Advanced Base Force, himself.[7] Over the decades he had made what could be taken as common sense recommendations on the organization of the Corps. Given his protests about the Marine Corps, a desire to tell Marines how to do their jobs must have been expected. General Lejeune recalled in his autobiography that Fullam’s bid to control the advanced base force was genuine and would have had a genuine negative effect on the morale of the Corps.[8] Field grade Marine officers, on the verge of becoming general officers, bore witness and were participants in the evolution of naval operations. This small cadre of 50 Marine officers, including George Barnett, Lejeune, Dion Williams, Eli K. Cole, John H. Russell, and Robert H. Dunlap were graduates of the Naval Academy, and spent their formative years in the “new Navy” beside their classmates; these Marines fully understood the motivations and bought into the creation of the force.
This is not to say that none of Fullam’s criticism had any merit, it’s just that the perceived failure of the advanced base outfit could not all be laid at the feet of the Marines. Biddle’s rebuttal noted that it wasn’t until 1907 that the Army removed itself from competition for the advanced base mission and had turned over its resources to the Navy. It wasn’t until 1911 that the Navy turned over all the ABF material to the Marines for inventory and maintenance; everyone agreed that the material and equipment supplied to the Marines was obsolescent and incomplete. And while the General Board had been responsible for ordering the garrisoning of regiment sized units of Marines at Cavite and Olongopo, the Marines reported to the Secretary of the Navy and the President; when the Marines were told to form an expedition, they complied with their orders quickly and as efficiently as they knew how. The constant tempo of expeditionary operations requiring Marines normally assigned to the Advanced Base School prevented the cadre from evolving into a more mature training resource. However, the failure to designate a permanent command structure and determine the composition of the force rested in the Marines’ court.
Admiral Dewey and the Board did not let Commandant Biddle down in terms of political support. Fullam’s report, and the uproar in its wake, forced Commandant Biddle to fully prepare for the upcoming Fleet and landing exercises of 1914, to best prove that the faith of the General Board was not misplaced. Fullam identified that the Marines remained trapped in an operational conundrum, but political conditions in the Caribbean and Mexico would propel the service to move beyond the theory of landing operations. Fullam’s vision of permanent garrisoned regiments of Marines would have to wait until larger events shaped the composition of the Corps.
FLEET EXERCISES AT CULEBRA
The Marine Corps entered 1914 with a need to show its mastery of the Advanced Base Force mission. In the wake of the discourse following William Fullam’s critique of the force, and the Advanced Base School, Commandant Biddle sought to prove to the General Board, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt, that the Marines were capable of the mission. The Navy asked the Marines to display their abilities:
1. Stowing material on transports;
2. Landing material from transport to the beach;
3. Transporting the material from the beach to various sites;
4. Preparation of battery sites and mounting of guns;
5. Establishment of fire control and observation points;
6. Planting of mines;
7. Defense of mine fields;
8. Establishment and use of searchlight stations;
9. Exercise with guns, including target practice;
10. Covering the site selected against attack from the land, including transportation necessary for supply and handling material.[9]
The Navy was asking for a display of competency, they wouldn’t be asking for a formal written landing doctrine from the Marines for almost twenty years. Despite the Marines having conducted advanced base landing operations for over a decade, the Marines were still in the process of learning best practices. Previous exercises displayed shortfalls; instances where Marines slaved day and night to manhandle guns ashore and up hills as fast as possible, only to find that parts critical to the guns operation were missing made for hard lessons. At Olongopo, Marines had to transport, assemble and mount guns without fire control apparatus, and on an earlier occasions at Culebra, they had transported the wrong parts for the guns’ platforms and had to be jury-rigged on site. During the Fullam review in the summer of 1913 Lieutenant Colonel Dion Williams, the recognized proponent of the advanced base mission, had gone to the files at headquarters to see what doctrinal work the Marines had on file. All he could find was a copy of his own presentation to the Naval War College.[10]
As important as the advanced base mission was to the service, some officers were recognizing that in developing landing operations policies and procedures, on the path to doctrine, there were other areas of expeditionary warfare they needed to focus on. In the January 1914 issue of Proceedings, First Lieutenant Henry N. Manney, Jr., USMC, wrote “The Expeditionary Work of the Quartermaster's Department”, regarding what will eventually be termed “combat loading” by logisticians. He suggests best practices for dealing with ships not designed as Marine transports, HANCOCK, PRAIRIE, and DIXIE are mentioned, and makes suggestions for future vessels. Manney’s recommendations are clearly intended to make future evolutions more efficient and reduce the effect embarkation and landing operations cargo have on the Marines on board.
In anticipation of the Atlantic Fleet’s Winter Exercises in January, elements of the Department of the Navy initiated movement for the evolution in October; in November Captain Earl “Pete” Ellis traveled from Headquarters Marine Corps to Culebra “for the purpose of making a reconnaissance of that island in connection with the winter exercises of 1914.”[11] The two regiments of the Advanced Base brigade boarded ship in Philadelphia in November; Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long, USMC, commanded the fixed regiment and Lieutenant Colonel John Lejeune, USMC, commanded the mobile regiment. Long was an 1891 graduate of USNA, was Officer in Charge of the Advanced Base School and had worked with the Navy on modifying USS HANCOCK for transporting Marines. Lejeune graduated from USNA in 1888 and was CO of the Marine Barracks at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Colonel George Barnett, USMC, and USNA 1881, commanded the Marine Barracks at League Island and was appointed the brigade commander of the two regiments. All three had entered the service at the beginning of the American naval renaissance and serving as Mahanian concepts influenced the sea services.
For the Winter Fleet Exercises, the country of “RED[12]” declared war on the U.S. on December 15. The Atlantic Fleet assembled and transported the Advanced Base Brigade to Culebra, in the Puerto Rican Territory. The fixed regiment of the Advanced Base Brigade, which was the permanent cadre at the Advanced Base School, set sail for the Caribbean island on January 3rd. Marines formed the mobile regiment under Lejeune at Philadelphia and embarked aboard the long-suffering USS PRAIRIE on November 27, 1913, and sailed for Pensacola. Lejeune remembered the exercise:
“The Marine Corps, however, played true to form so far as the Second Regiment was concerned, as on the day before Thanksgiving my orders were received directing me to proceed to Philadelphia immediately and assume command of the Second Regiment which was being assembled there.”[13]
Much like Huntington’s Battalion in 1898, the assembled unit didn’t sail directly for their objective. Lejeune and his Marines took up occupancy at the barracks of the shuttered naval station at Pensacola for a period of training as a regiment. As they were a unit assembled of Marines from all over the United States, it made sense for them to train together for a period prior to the exercise, much as Huntington’s Battalion trained together at Key West before going to Cuba. Lejeune had been stationed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, his Regimental Adjutant, Captain Frederick Delano had been at Naval War College, Lieutenants Cole and Conger had been stationed at Boston, his Quartermaster, Captain Jeter Horton, had been at the Philadelphia Quartermaster warehouse, Major Wendell Neville had been at the barracks in Charleston, SC, Major Randolph Berkley had been at Puget Sound Navy Yard, and Major Phillip Brown had been at Norfolk;[14] their Marines were similarly from diverse stations. The formation of the mobile regiment was in the tradition the Marine Corps had followed for expeditions for decades. Despite the remonstrations of naval reformers such as William Fullam, and Bowman McCalla before him, Marine leadership remained devoted to forming expeditionary units from whole cloth. It would take a world war, and unprecedented expansion, for Marines to realized that in the 20thcentury the Marines would fight as battalions, regiments, and divisions.
On January 9, 1914, the Advanced Base Brigade dropped anchor off the shore of Culebra Island. Sea state and prevailing winds limited when ships’ craft to only working mornings. Thirteen years of exercises had given the Marines and sailors a basic knowledge of getting oversized and extremely heavy equipment ashore. Frederick Wise explained:
“Lighters we had carried down on the HANCOCK’s deck were swung overboard. Those heavy naval guns were hauled up from the holds, lowered aboard the lighters, and towed ashore by launches. They were skidded ashore the portable railroad was constructed up to the gun positions high on the hills, gun-pits dug, platforms built, guns mounted.”
The brigade turned-to and constructed the defenses of the base within the six days allotted. As with previous exercises they could expect an attack of bluejackets and Marines landed from ships of the fleet acting as “RED” forces. Officers of the fleet inspected the brigade; Admiral Charles Johnston Badger, USN, reported:
“Attention is invited to the very complete outfit of the Advance(sic) Base Detachment and to the great variety of military work required of officers and men. Rifle pits and bomb proof shelters have been dug, 3” and 5” guns have been landed in transports, dragged up steep declivities and installed ready for firing. Methods for both direct and indirect fire have been perfected for both fixed and field artillery. Mine fields have been laid, and an aviation camp has been established. The problem of supply to the numerous outlying camps have been well worked out in a waterless country almost devoid of supplies. A very complete system of communications, including 4 miles of telephone system, a radio plan, a night and day heliograph system and a flag semaphore system have been established. All parts of this work seem to have been done in an extraordinarily efficient manner.”[15]
Commander William S. Sims commanded the gaggle of umpires observing the exercises; Sims and crew determined that the Advanced Base Brigade had denied the “RED” forces command of the base, or harbor at Culebra. Only months after William Fullam’s scathing criticism of the ABF, Barnett’s Brigade in Puerto Rico proved itself capable of supporting fleet operations by defending a temporary advanced base constructed on the fly hundreds of miles from the safety of domestic harbors. That fall, newly appointed Major General Commandant George Barnett reported to the Secretary of the Navy and Congress:
“In connection with this reference to advance base it may be proper to state that an impression seems to prevail that advance base work is purely a Marine Corps matter. This is an error, as there can be no doubt that advance base work is essentially a naval matter in which the entire service is most deeply interested, and while the execution of the work is placed in the hands of the Marine Corps it is nevertheless necessary for successful results that it be given earnest cooperation by and coordination with the various branches of the naval service. It is hoped that every facility will be provided the corps for the continuing of their work, and if so, steps should be taken not only to perfect the outfit but also to devote as much time as possible to the training of the men in this work.”
While the Marines had worked with the Navy to prepare the ships for the men and equipment of the Advanced Base Brigade, they noted common problems; the boats weren’t up the task in their design, and the ease in deploying them from the main deck of the transports was lacking. Also, the Marines recommended the purchase of automotive drayage to assist moving the six-ton guns into place once ashore.
The fleet exercise at Culebra in January of 1914 is a milestone in the evolution of American landing operations doctrine and serves as a foundation for current amphibious doctrine. At Culebra the Marines integrated naval aviation, wireless communications, advanced logistics, and tactical training to accomplish a heady task. The advanced base set up in Puerto Rico that winter was light-years ahead of what had been established at Guantanamo fifteen years earlier.
VERACRUZ
The landing at and occupation of the Mexican port city of Vera Cruz is often viewed through the prism of the “small wars” or “banana wars” that dominated the United States’ Latin-America policy of the early 20th century. While other Central and South American countries were the recipient of repeat landings made by the Navy and Marines, Mexico was of particular interest to the United States. During the 19th century its proximity and markets made it an important trade partner. As a major customer of burgeoning American industrial products and technologies — the triumvirate of coal, iron, and railways — the relationship resulted in immense growth in wealth among the hacendados and President-for-life Porfirio Díaz’s supporters.
Mexico’s place at the table of international commerce changed with the discovery of oil at the turn of the century. Over the span of a decade, Mexico had become the world’s second largest oil producer, behind the U.S. Mexico had been a major marketplace for American goods before the discovery of oil. Oil turned Mexico into an exporter, and place where American companies could profit from oil investments. When the Mexican people finally had enough of Díaz’ policies, and his fixed elections, they acted; on 20 November 1910, the Mexican Revolution began, led by Francisco I. Madero.
Successive administrations had looked with a benevolent eye towards Díaz and his successors. As long as “American interests” were taken care of, the U.S. remained uninterested in Mexican politics. American investors, and the landed and rich of Mexico prospered under this policy, until Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States. Just weeks after General Victoriano Huerta murdered President Madero in a coup, Wilson took the oath of office and refused to recognize the Mexican strongman. As the revolution plodded on, Wilson’s policy towards the Mexican government became one of “watchful waiting”. Officially neutral on the revolution, Wilson ended the arms embargo on Mexico, which benefitted Constitutionalist revolutionaries. By the fall of 1913 rebel forces had advanced close enough to Tampico, a hub of U.S. and international oil investment, to warrant Wilson dispatching warships to the Mexican coast to defend “American interests” and evacuate expatriate workers if the need arose.
In December of 1913 and January of 1914 the Advance Base Brigade conducted landing exercises at Culebra Island, Porto Rico, in conjunction with elements of the Atlantic Fleet. With the end of the exercises, the Fixed Regiment of the brigade boarded USS HANCOCK and sailed for New Orleans. The Mobile Regiment boarded USS PRAIRIE, and sailed for Pensacola, Florida. The advanced base exercises had been planned for almost a year, so the Marines were fully trained and fully equipped. Having two regiments of Marines embarked on troop transports in the Gulf of Mexico while the crisis at Tampico was brewing proved serendipitous. Understanding that there was little prospect of a naval campaign requiring an Advanced Base Brigade to secure an advanced base, the 1st Advanced Base Brigade was redesignated the 1stBrigade on April 1; if Marines had special skills not needed in the landing, they would revert to their original training, that of Marine infantry.
By early April, Tampico was under attack by rebel forces. The Federalist defenders were firing OVER the city from the river at rebel positions on the outskirts of town. Oil tanks were on fire, and the situation tenuous. On April 8 Federalist soldiers temporarily detained a Marine carrying dispatches from the consul to U.S. warships in the Rio Panuco. On the 9th Federalist soldiers detained and questioned a Navy working party picking up fuel in the city. Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, USN, responded to the diplomatic affront by demanding the Mexican officer responsible be punished, that an apology be issued by the Mexican garrison commander, and that Mexican forces fire a 21-gun salute as they raised an American flag in public.
While the local Mexican commander was able to oblige Mayo with the first two demands, the third required guidance from General Huerta’s headquarters in Mexico City. Huerta vacillated, refusing to render the salute until he could gain recognition for his rule from the U.S. The situation descended into diplomatic turmoil, as Woodrow Wilson largely ignored his State Department, having already dispatched his own envoy for talks with the Mexicans. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, remained a spectator to the crisis, waiting to see what Rear Admiral Mayo and the Mexicans would come up with next. As Wilson’s repeated deadlines came and went, the nation followed the situation in the news. The “Tampico Affair” approached climax, then disappeared when it was reported that an arms shipment was headed for the Mexican port city of Veracruz. The German merchantman YPIRINGA had picked up a shipment of arms in New York, unknown to the American government, then had sailed to Germany, and was bound for Vera Cruz. Bearing arms and ammunition for Huerta’s Federalist forces YPIRINGA stood a chance of upsetting President Wilson’s policy of “watchful waiting”.
When the shipment was confirmed to the President in the early morning hours of April 21, 1914, Wilson issued the order “Take Vera Cruz at once.”
The Navy department ordered Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher to seize the customs house, cable office, and post office, and prevent the German steamer SS YPIRINGA from delivering her shipment of arms for Huerta. Available to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels for the landing was the balance of the Atlantic Fleet, Rear Admiral Mayo’s section at Tampico, and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher’s section at Vera Cruz. Additionally Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Neville, USMC, commanded the Mobile Regiment of the 1st Provisional Brigade aboard USS PRAIRIE, which had been off the coast of Vera Cruz since February. Attached to his unit were the Marine guards from the battleships of Rear Admiral Fletcher’s section. Colonel John Lejeune, his brigade headquarters, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long with the Fixed Regiment were aboard HANCOCK at Tampico. Within a day’s sailing of Vera Cruz, Josephus Daniels had over 3,000 Bluejackets and Marines ready to land. At Vera Cruz, Neville had been working with Rear Admiral Fletcher and his staff on a plan for taking the port since his arrival. In total Fletcher had 500 Marines and 280 sailors available at Veracruz.
In Vera Cruz’ outer harbor, the fleet stood by, deck guns trained on landmarks ashore. UTAH was further out, awaiting the arrival of the German steamer YPIRINGA. Once Lieutenant Colonel Neville sent his message to Rear Admiral Fletcher, “Am ready”, at 1030 on the 21st, Marines and Bluejackets climbed into whaleboats which were then towed by ships’ launches from the outer harbor to Pier Four. After travelling from FLORIDA and PRAIRIE to the inner harbor, the landing force climbed from their boats onto Pier 4. The Marines moved on the rail yard, cable office, and Terminal Hotel; sailors from USS FLORIDA stepped off towards the Customs House, Post Office, and telegraph office. The sailors brought with them a single landing gun — a field piece and ammunition limber drawn by hand by a dozen Bluejackets — and Colt-Browning machine guns on heavy tripods.
As the Americans moved into the city, Veracruzanos began firing on them from all directions, including from buildings they had already passed. The Americans returned fire with their Springfield rifles and trained their machine guns on open windows and rooftops. During the pitched fighting, the sailors took their objectives and built barricades to consolidate their holdings. Veracruzanos and a company of Federalist soldiers offered the Americans an unorganized but vigorous opposition, firing from windows, doorways, and rooftops. By the end of the first day, the landing force lost four killed, and dozens wounded. The Federalists and Veracruzanos lost a much larger, uncounted number. Bluejacket litter bearers and corpsmen tended to the fallen Americans.
Unwilling to continue their advance in the dark, the landing regiment, led by Captain William Rush, the CO of FLORIDA, held their position, planning to resume the advance in the morning. Some sniping continued overnight. In the morning, the Bluejackets of USS NEW HAMPSHIRE landed at he Promenade, and stepped off in column of twos, marching in formation towards the Mexican Naval Academy. As could be expected, the cadets at the academy chose to fight. Withering fire stopped the marching sailors, who quickly fled the crossfire on the streets to the safety of the Promenade, nearly stampeding the battalion from UTAH who had been following them in trail.[16]
As the sailors of NEW HAMPSHIRE regrouped in the open area of the Promenade, the crews manning the deck guns aboard CHESTER and PRAIRIE targeted the windows of the Naval Academy and opened fire. Their 5-inch guns silenced the Mexican cadets, and took a heavy toll on the buildings of the Academy. Marines and sailors continued to land in the harbor, and by noon of the second day, Vera Cruz was in American hands. The Navy assumed control of the city for a week, until the Army’s 5th Brigade arrived from Texas aboard Army transport ships. The Army took control of the occupation, building on their experiences from the Philippines and Cuba.
Because the landing at Vera Cruz is often lumped in with the “Banana Wars” as an expedition, it’s presumed transports just docked at the pier and offloaded sailors and Marines. This was true in the later phase, when the Army arrived, but the landing at Vera Cruz on April 21st and 22nd was much closer to a forced entry of the city. Rear Admiral Fletcher quickly established his landing force ashore under fire; the force went from zero men ashore to a brigade sized force in a few hours; the landing commenced upon an order, and continued under the direction of a unified command; Fletcher used naval gunfire in support of the landing, and mobile artillery landed to support the regiments ashore; Fletcher established a flexible communication system between ship and shore; supplies and resupplies were fed ashore, and the wounded were evacuated to ships of the fleet; small boats with organic guns provided immediate gunfire support and direction alongside the fleet in the harbor; counter-mine operations were conducted as the harbor was secured. Anyone familiar with ‘Joint Publication 3-02, Amphibious Operations’ would recognize some of these conditions as elements of current-day amphibious operations. While this was not the first time the Navy conducted a complex landing operation — this level of planning and organization occurred during the attack on Fort George in 1813, and on various landings during the Civil War — it was significant because it was the first instance in which the “new Navy” conducted one.
Vera Cruz wasn’t the only Marine Corps commitment of 1914; the 1st and 2nd Regiments formed the Advanced Base Brigade in Mexico; the 3rd Regiment was formed at League Island in April, as the occupation of Vera Cruz began, and joined the brigade there at the end of the month; the 4th Regiment formed at Bremerton, Washington, and deployed to the waters off the west coast of Mexico — when it was obvious they wouldn’t be needed there, they redeployed to San Diego in July; the 5th Regiment had been assembled and embarked aboard HANCOCK in response to an emergency at Santo Domingo, where they were stationed off shore. As the Advanced Base Brigade returned to the U.S. in November, it dispersed to where barracks were available for the companies and battalions; Headquarters, Signals, the 1st Regiment, and part of the 2nd Regiment took up residence at League Island, the Artillery Battalion was deposited at Annapolis, and a company of Infantry went into barracks at Pensacola.
The General Board reinforced its requirement for forward based units aboard ship in the annual report, recommending a permanent brigade organization be maintained in the Marines Corps, and that advanced base exercises occur year by year. The Board also noted that larger ships with better flexibility for troop transport were required; the current vessels in service, PRAIRIE, and HANCOCK, were small, and outdated. After return to the states, the fixed regiment experienced reorganization based upon the Culebra exercises, and service in Mexico. The brigade commander, by then Colonel Littleton Waller, was given the signals company as part of his headquarters, artillery remained organized in battalions, but companies separated by their “fixed” or “mobile” applications.
ADVANCED BASE COMMANDANT
George Barnett has not been widely remembered or celebrated for his tenure as the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps. Indeed, after six-years as commandant, he was replaced in the post by a Marine eight years his junior, three years before he was required to retire. During his career he had been awarded no personal decorations for combat heroism. His most important service friendships were most likely those he developed among his Naval Academy classmates. Other Marines judged him as being “political”, and historians don’t remember him much for his accomplishments. However, there may have been no Marine of the era more perfectly positioned to run the Marine Corps.
Barnett was a product of the Naval Academy, class of 1881, and his early professional career coincided with the excitement created by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan’s work created an optimism that surrounded the creation of the “new Navy”. Barnett was one of the first of fifty Marine lieutenants commissioned through the Naval academy between 1883 and 1898. During his career, he shared the officers’ mess with a fraternity of naval officers. Before the war with Spain, the academy was the sole commissioning source for the Corps. This condition that would create a division amongst Marine officers, aligning those with academy ties against those who hadn’t. And while the new navalism of the age didn’t seem to pertain much to the Marine Corps, Navy officers recognized a need for the Marine Corps in their planning for the 20th century.
George Barnett’s early career was mostly routine, with just a bit of unconventional mixed in. Commissioned in 1883, Barnett served fifteen years as a lieutenant before pinning on captain’s bars. He received Marine officer training at the Marine Barracks aboard the Brooklyn Navy Yard, then was posted to the ocean tug USS PINTA on the west coast, and to the Marine Barracks at Siska in the Alaska Territory. Then, a shipboard billet with the Marine detachment aboard USS IROQUOIS preceded his posting to the DC barracks, which included special duty at the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893. From there he was assigned to the Marine barracks at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, then to a receiving ship at Brooklyn, the USRS VERMONT, before commanding the Marine guard aboard USS SAN FRANCISCO. With the start of the war with Spain Barnett transferred to the USS NEW ORLEANS née AMAZONAS and served in Cuban waters.[17] NEW ORLEANS missed the Battle of Santiago, which aside from Manila Bay and Guantanamo, was one of the few opportunities for Marines to “see action”.
Before and at the turn of the century, Barnett’s Navy peers enjoyed a period of peacetime expansion. Congress freed up appropriations for new technology and ships, and the Navy made significant investments in the professional development of her officers. The Naval War College, as manifested by Stephen Luce, and the writings of Alfred Mahan fueled the strategic imaginations of a generation of Navy officers. The establishment of the Naval Institute, with its Proceedings magazine, encouraged debate on the course and development of the Navy. Beyond maneuvering squadrons and fighting the fleet, professionals considered the logistical and administrative requirements required in supporting the fleet. Planners realized that when operating in foreign waters, the fleet would need safe locations to refuel and rearm. To secure these locations, these advanced bases, the Navy would need a landing force trained and equipped for operations in the littorals; some, including Mahan, viewed the Marines as being, ideally, the “backbone to any force landing on the enemy’s coast”.[18]
The war with Spain was the first American war in a generation, and largely naval in nature. Whether a Marine “saw action” during the hostilities mattered within the insular brotherhood. In ensuing years, Marines would accumulate combat experience fighting Filipino rebels in the islands, and fighting Boxers during the relief of Pekin. These actions would establish bona fides for officers and NCOs. Combat veterans were held above their peers. Seeing action accelerated the careers and promotions of more than a few. George Elliot was a captain and company commander at Guantanamo, where he was brevetted for heroism. Five years later, Elliot became Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps.
In February of 1914, after commanding the Advanced Base Brigade in a crucial, but successful exercise at Culebra, in the Porto Rican Territory, George Barnett assumed the post of Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps. If his 1915 annual report to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels is any indicator, he was fully invested in the advanced base force mission, and in training Marines required to support it:
“It is manifest that the companies assigned the difficult task of preparing themselves to carry out these special duties should always be kept up to their full strength: that a sufficient number of such companies should be assigned to the duties, and, being so assigned, that they should not be diverted from their highly technical training in order to provide mobile forces for expeditionary duty, detachment s for navy yards, or for other purposes.”
In terms of organizational development, the Marine Corps did not enjoy the same sort of renaissance the Navy did in the years leading up to the war with Spain. Commandant after commandant in the late 1800s fought for appropriations to improve facilities, and for manning levels to maintain the most basic support for the shipboard guard and navy yard security assignments. Marine leaders fought off repeated critiques of Navy officers intent on pushing Marines into obscurity or out of existence. However, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington’s mission to Guantanamo in June of 1898 prompted the General Board to demand more from the Marine Corps, to support the operational needs of the fleet.
Shortly after Secretary of the Navy John Long formed the General Board of the Navy in 1900, the Board ordered studies on coaling stations in the new territories be conducted, and on the best composition of an “advanced base force”. After a decade of gestation, and the existential battle with members of the Navy and the Army, and over-commitments to numerous non-advanced base expeditions, George Barnett found himself at the head of a Marine Corps possessing capabilities in the General Board only dreamed of in 1900. In his selection, Barnett proved himself as an ideal administrator of the service.
As the General Board pursued studies, and made recommendations to successive Secretaries of the Navy, they plunged the Marine Corps into a total force transformation; geo-political circumstances required a rapid evolution from being a small security force tasked with shipboard and navy yard security, to an one capable of policing the new territories, and support the fleet as an “advanced base force”. And while conservatives within the organization clung to its traditional roles aboard ship and in Navy yards, they also warmed to the role as a colonial constabulary in a fit of organizational inertia. And it wasn’t very long before the two paths created a friction within the Marines’ officer ranks.
The instinct to serve as a territorial constabulary ran counter to the operational needs of the fleet, interfering with the development of the advanced base force outfit. Those who gravitated towards the naval character of the Marines recognized that the advanced base force mission was where they should invest their efforts. As a colonial constabulary, the Marines operated as a smaller, more nimble version of the Army, but still reporting to a Navy chain of command. On occasion, at the directive of the President, Marine units could report directly to the Army, as they had in Mexico in 1846, on Samar in the Philippines, in Cuba in 1906 and Vera Cruz in 1914. In the other camp, Marine leaders recognized that the advanced base mission intrinsic to Navy operational goals, and potentially a greater mission as a seaborne rapid response outfit. Occupying and defending advanced bases for the fleet was just a starting point to other forms of landing operations the Navy would require of the Marines.
“the ships of our battle fleet must return to the advanced base and recoal, refit, revictual, transfer the wounded, and make ready to take advantage of the first victory and carry the war to the enemy’s territory.”[19]
Barnett was in command of the brigade because he’d commanded the Marine Barracks at Philadelphia since 1910. The barracks were the parent command of Marines aboard the navy yard, including those running the Advanced Base School. The staff of the school composed the cadre for the “fixed” regiment of the ABF. The Philadelphia Navy Yard, on League Island, had become an embarkation hub for Marine expeditions of the era. The Marine Quartermasters owned a large warehouse in the city where they stored and manufactured much of the tentage, uniforms, and equipment used by Marines in the field. Philadelphia was also a quick train ride from the Navy yards of the northeast — Portsmouth, Boston, Brooklyn, DC, and Norfolk — which granted the commandant the ability to gather a large force from the barracks for “duty beyond the seas” within 24 or 48-hours. This had been the traditional means by which the Marine Corps responded to orders for a battalion or regiment of men, such as in 1885 for the Panama expedition, or Guantanamo in 1898.
Major General Commandant George Elliot opened the Advanced Base School in New London in 1910, and Major General Commandant William Biddle moved the school to League Island the following year. By that time, Barnett was already in command of the barracks there and assumed much of the responsibility for the school. Lieutenant Frederic Wise, stationed at League Island, wrote:
“Hours every day in the Yard we had to haul those three-inch guns around. We had to build a portable railroad. We had to dig pits. We had to build gun-platforms. We had to mount the guns. And then, when we had it all done, we had to tear the whole business down and do it all over again.”[20]
The school’s location in Philadelphia was a double-edged sword, however; as multiple expeditions for service in the Caribbean were ordered, the commandant drew on the barracks for men to staff them. Commandant Biddle reported
“The course at the Advance Base School, Philadelphia, Pa., has been materially interfered with by the expeditions to Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Cuba, though actual service in the field has been of great value to the 3-inch landing gun battery and the signal company.”[21]
Barnett himself deployed four times in four years before the Culebra exercise. In the wake of the success of the Porto Rican exercise, Barnett was summoned to DC, and anointed Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps in February of 1914.
Barnett had peers vying for the commandancy with more combat experience — regarded a qualifying trait by many of the conservatives in the Corps — but he possessed the ideal qualifications and background to nurture development of the advanced base outfit. George Barnett had been appointed to the United States Naval Academy in 1877, as the Navy was entering a renaissance in professionalism. While at Annapolis, Barnett developed life-long connections with his fellow midshipmen, some of whom would go on to greater things in business, and in Congress. Graduating in 1881, he encountered the sclerotic promotions system afflicting the naval services. After their two year stint as “passed midshipmen” serving with the fleet, not all graduates of the USNA were offered commissions; the Navy had a backlog of 200 graduates waiting for up to eight years for a position in the fleet to open up.[22] Rather than being cashiered, Barnett accepted one of ten Marine commissions.[23] Because of these problems with commissions and promotions, the USNA Class of 1881 formed a lobbying group on the behalf of themselves. Early on, George Barnett learned the art of self-advocacy and lobbying within the Navy Department.
So after thirty years in the service, George Barnett became the first graduate of the Naval Academy to become Commandant. His close ties to peers in the Navy granted him the access and connections required to navigate the halls of government, and to be able to negotiate support for the growing service. Barnett’s competitors for the commandancy were not-selected for reasons; as a Lieutenant Colonel, John Lejeune was not senior enough; Lincoln Karmany, Barnett’s classmate at Annapolis, was a drinker, and had just gone through a public, messy, divorce; Littleton Waller was a drinker, not an academy grad, and remained notorious for publicity generated in his service at Samar in the Philippines.
If you regard the development of the Advanced Base Force as an essential step in the evolution of American amphibious doctrine in the 20th century, it’s hard to think of a Marine more suited for the commandancy than George Barnett. In 1914, John Lejeune was too junior to assume the mantle of responsibility for the entire Marine Corps, and Barnett had unmatched political ties, except for Smedley Butler. Barnett had been brought up in an era where naval supremacy hadn’t been attained by the U.S., yet, and required leaders bought in to reforming traditional Marine and Navy roles in operational thought. Concurrent to his career, Navy planners at the Naval War College were drafting plans that would develop into Plan Orange, positioning the United States against Japan in the Pacific. The Advanced Base Force was a integral tool to the Navy being able to take the fight to Japanese waters.
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels chose Barnett over the more senior, popular, and conservative Waller, polarizing many of the officers of the Corps. On his side, Barnett had no black marks in his service record book and had married well; in 1908 he wed Lelia Godon, a well-respected widow and member of DC society. Barnett however, ascribed his selection to the success of the exercise at Culebra, where his command accomplished all objectives within the proscribed interval, and successfully “fought off” an attacking opposition force. The Marines’ performance even garnered praise from one of the Marines’ greatest critics, Captain William Sims.
Going into the exercise, the Corps was smarting from the most recent attack made by long-time critic Captain William Fullam, USN, then Daniel’s aide for inspections. During the exercise, the Advanced Base Brigade performed as well as anyone could foresee, and Fullam’s recommendations were soon forgotten. Barnett became commandant, and appointed John Lejeune his assistant.
As commandant, Barnett led the service with the guidance of the General Board — focusing on its role as a landing force capable of securing an advanced base for the Navy. However, expeditionary work continued apace, with a large commitment made to the occupation of Haiti in 1915, where 2,000 Marines under Littleton Waller deployed to keep the peace, and to the Dominican Republic in 1916. Even as the United States sought to stay out of the European war, the armed services embarked on a course of mobilization with the intent to defend American neutrality. The Marines grew from 15,000 hands in 1915 to 31,000 before Congress declared war.
[1] Edward S. Miller. War Plan Orange, The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 1991. P.72.
[2] Commandant’s Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 1913.
[3] A Brief History of the First Marines. Historical Branch, G-3 Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, DC. 1968. PDF
[4] Report of the Commandant, 1913.
[5] Brian McAllister Linn. “William Phillips Biddle 1911-1914”. Commandants of the Marine Corps, Alland R. Millett and Jack Shulimson ed. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 2004. p.167.
[6] Clifford. Progress and Purpose. p.17.
[7] Clifford. Progress and Purpose. p.
[8] Lejeune. Reminiscences.
[9] Clifford. Progress and Purpose.
[10] MUST FIND THIS SOURCE
[11] Marine Corps Muster Rolls November 1913.
[12] Merrill L. Bartlett. Lejeune, A Marine’s Life, 1867-1942. The country of “RED” is identified as Germany, which was popularly regarded as the competitor in the Caribbean in the days before the Panama Canal was opened, but Navy war planning codex identified Great Britain as “RED”, and Germany as “BLACK”? According to Edward S. Miller’s War Plan ORANGE, The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945.
[13] Lejeune. Reminiscences.
[14] Marine Corps Muster Rolls. Anscestry dot com.
[15] Andy Barnett, ed. George Barnett, Marine Corps Commandant, A Memoir, 1877-1923. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. Jefferson, NC. 2015. Kindle Edition.
[16] Jack Sweetman. The Landing at Veracruz: 1914. United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. 1968.
[17] Wikipedia entry. AMAZONAS was a Brazilian warship built in Newcastle, England by the Navy in May 1898, and re-named USS NEW ORLEANS. She served in the blockade of Cuba, but was at Key West when Cervera’s squadron attempted to break out of Santiago de Cuba on 3 July. As per 19th century conventions, “cowardice” was alleged.
[18] Shulimson. Mission. p.144.
[19] Dion Williams. “The Advanced Base”. Lecture, Naval War College. 1912.
[20] Frederic Wise. A Marine Tells It To You. J.H. Sears & Company, Inc. New York. 1929. p.119.
[21] Commandant’s Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 1913.
[22] George Barnett. George Barnett, Marine Corps Commandant: A Memoir, 1877-1923. Andy Barnett, ed. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. Jefferson. 2015. Kindle edition.
[23] Jack Shulimson. The Marine Corps Search for a Mission; 1880-1898. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence. 1993. USNA class of 1881 commissioned 3 assistant naval constructors, 3 engineers, and 7 ensigns of the line, as well as the 10 Marine lieutenants.
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